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SOME FEDERAL TAX CASES
It is the purpose of this paper to direct attention to two
most singular and indefensible decisions of the Supreme Court
of the United States with respect to the taxation by States of
corporations, foreign to them, which are engaged in interstate
commerce. The first is the case of
The Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S., 18
The Palace Car Co. is an Illinois corporation. It furnishes
cars to railroad companies, which attach them to their trains.
Passengers in these cars pay the regular fare to the Railroad
Company, and an additional fare to the Car Company for the use
of the car. The Car Company thus furnishes cars to railroad
companies in many States. The State of Pennsylvania has imposed a tax upon it. The size of this tax is determined in this
way. The company declares dividends upon its stock. This
dividend is a certain percentage on the par value of the stock.
If it is six per cent., one-half of six, i. e., three mills are assessed
on a portion of the capital stock which is ascertained by considering the whole number of miles traversed in all the Sates by any
cars of the company, and the number of miles in Pennsylvania,
traversed by any of its cars. The ratio between these numbers,
is the ratio of the capital stock upon which the tax is imposed.
If one-tenth of the mileage is in Pennsylvania, then the tax at
the ascertained rate, is imposed on one-tenth of the whole capital
stock. The company objecting to this method of ascertaining
the tax, appealed from the settlement of the tax to the Common
Pleas of Dauphin county; thence to the Supreme Court of the
State, and thence to the Supreme Court of the United States.
It must be remembered that the corporation was of Illinois.
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It could not be taxed in Pennsylvania as a resident. Nor could
it be taxed for the privilege of drawing its cars into the State.
This privilege is not derived from the State of Pennsylvania,
and could not be subjected to a burden by that State. The tax
was not on the occupation of the company. If justifiable, the tax
was a tax upon the corporate property.
A State cannot tax any other property of a foreign corporation, than that which is within the State. The State of the domicile may tax the inhabitant upon his property, personal at least,
wherever it may be.
Now the only property of the Car Company within the State
was its cars. tach car is continually coming and going. It is
now within, now without the State, but the court finds the company has at all times substantially the same number of cars within the State; about 100.
If the object had been candidly to tax the property, the
method would have been simple. What each car would cost,
would approximately be its worth. If the cars could be got for
$20,000 a piece, and could be sold for $20,000 then the 100 cars
would be worth $2,000,000. Multiplying this by the proposed
rate, would give the sum payable.
Or, another method might be adopted. The corporation had
no other property than its cars. Assuming that the value of its
capital stock is equivalent to the value of its property, the amount
of stock to be taxed in this State, would be the amount of its
property here. If the company had 1000 cars, which were worth
the capital stock, and 100 of these cars were constantly in this
State, that is one-tenth of the whole number, one-tenth of the
value of the capital stock would be regarded the value of the cars
in this State, and the tax could be assessed upon this value.
Strange to say, although the number of cars in this State
was carefully found, no use whatever was made of it. A totally
different basis of assessment was adopted. Instead of learning
the ratio of the cars habitually in Pennsylvania, to the whole
number of cars, and taxing this ratio of the capital stock, the
method fallen upon was to learn the whole number of miles everywhere that cars of the company traversed, and the whole number
of miles in this State, that cars traversed, and to take this ratio
as that of the capital stock upon which the tax was to be as-
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sessed. Says Gray, J., "The mode which the State of Pennsylvania adopted, to ascertain the proportion of the Company's property upon which it should be taxed in that State, was by taking
as a basis of assessment, such proportion of the capital stock of
the company as the number of miles over which it ran cars within
the State, bore to the whole number of miles in that and other
States, over which its cars were run."
We shall proceed to investigate the justice of this method,
not being bluffed by the ipse dixit of Gray, J., "This was a just
and equitable method of assessment, and if it were adopted by all
the States through which these cars ran, the company would be
assessed upon the whole value of its capital stock, and no more."
The tax would be hypothetically just to the company, truly,
if all the States adopted this method; that is, if they all imposed
the tax upon so much of the capital stock as was represented
by the ratio of the mileage in each State to the total mileage.
But there is no guaranty of the adoption of such a method by all
the States. Illinois where the corporation is, may constitutionally tax the whole of the capital stock. Ohio may tax a ratio borne
by the number of cars constantly in the State, to the whole number of cars, New York may tax not the capital stock, but the cars,
estimated as chattels, without relation to the value of the capital
stock; Maryland may tax a ratio not of the number of cars to all
the cars and not of the number of miles traversed by any cars to
the whole number of miles traversed.by any cars, but of the number of miles multiplied into the number of cars which traverse
them within the State, to the whole number of miles multiplied
into the number of cars which traverse them.
But, while the company could not complain, if the aggregate
of all the taxes paid by it in the several States would have been a
just tax had its property been wholly within one State, other corporations and individuals in a particular State would complain
that the method of assessment adopted was unfair to them, ,as
imposing a less burden on the Pullman Company, than was imposed on them. What is wanted is, not a tax which the taxable
cannot allege to be unjust to him, but'a tax which others cannot
allege to be unjust to them.
It is quite evident that the method commended by Gray, J.,
does not work out equitable results. The tax is to be laid on
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property, and a method which results in the erroneous valuation
of this property, eventuates in an unjust tax. Now, is the value of
a car in Pennsylvania proportional to the number of miles it travels? On one line Pullman cars are run 50 miles; on another line
200 miles. The former car, costing as much as the latter, is estimated at but one-fourth the value of the latter. In Pennsylvania 100
cars are traveling lines 1000 miles long; in Maryland the same
100 cars are traveling lines only 200 mies long. Then the company must, in the former State, pay five times as much tax as in
the latter, although the property is exactly the same in both.
In one State 100 miles of road are traversed four times daily
by 10 Pullman cars. In another State 100 miles are traversed but
one daily by 10 Pullman cars. It is clear that the dividends on
the stock which furnish the rate of tax, are produced not merely
by the length of the line over which any cars, one or many, run,
but by the frequency of their running. Yet the method of apportioning the tax ignores the number of cars running over a
given length of rail, and the number of times they run over this
length.
It is evident that the method adopted in the case examined,
for assessing the taxes, is adopted in order in fact to tax the
capital stock whose value is made not merely by the cars of the
corporation but by its good will, by its franchises, by its acts of
interstate transportation, etc. If the tax had been professedly
imposed upon such things, it would be the duty of the courts to
declare it unlawful. The tax must be on property, but in the valuation of the property, the value of business, franchise, etc., can be
imputed to the property, and thus the unlawful tax may pose as a
legitimate tax. And the courts wink at this palpable violation
of their own principles.
Of all the visible methods of ascertaining the value of the
property in Pennsylvania belonging to the Pullman Palace Car
Company the one adopted was the most unscientific, and was in
flagrant opposition to sound constitutional principles.
The Adams Express Company v. Ohio State Auditor, 165 U.S. 194
The State of Ohio imposed taxes on the property within its
limits of the Adams Express Company, the United States Express Company and the American Express Company. The act
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of assembly directed that the assessing board should assess the
property in Ohio as a unit, and, in doing so, should be guided by
the value of the entire capital stock of the corporations, and other
evidence and rules. The tax thus assessed was to be distributed
to the various counties in the proportion which the gross receipts of the corporation therein bore to the entire gross receipts
within the State. The board found that the Adams Express
Company had property within the State, worth $533,095; the
American Express Company $499,373, and the United States Express Co. $488,264.
The real property being separately assessible, the companies
alleged, and they were not contradicted, that their personal property in the State was respectively, $42,065, $28,438 and $23,430.
This property was composed of horses, wagons, harness, trucks,
safes and office fixtures. It was estimated by the company, at
the prices at which horses, wagons, etc., could be obtained in the
market. The estimate of the board of assessors was made by
assuming the total property of the corporation to be worth its
capital stock, and that that fraction of this property, which was
in Ohio, was worth a corresponding fraction of the capital stock.
The Ohio statute profess to tax the property of the corporation, but not the property beyond the state. It has been repeatedly
held that a State cannot tax a non-resident upon his property
not within the State. It can tax a resident upon his property,
wherever situated. It can tax a non-resident only upon his propertv found within its boundaries. '_Now these three corporations
were created by the laws of, and therefore had their domicile in,
other States.
The business of an express company is the business of transportation; of commerce. The business, of these companies, was
in part infra-state and in part inter-state. That the interstate
business would not be taxed is well settled. The law of Ohio
did not profess to attempt to tax it.
Although the intra-state business of a foreign corporation is
not protected by the Constitution of the United States, from regulation, from taxation, by a State,1 and Ohio might therefore have
2Postal Telegraph Co. v. Charleston, 1_3 U. S., 692.
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ascertained what this business amounted to in a year, and taxed
it, the State did not do so. It required the companies to make a
return of the "entire and gross receipts * * * from whatever
source derived, of business wherever done," 165 U. S., 236, and
also the gross receipts in Ohio, from whatever source derived.
But a tax on gross receipts, embracing, as they do, receipts for
transportation done wholly within Ohio, and receipts from transportations from points in Ohio to points beyond, or vice versa,
would be beyond the competence of Ohio. Telegraph Co. v.
Alabama, 132 U. S., 472; S. S. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U. S., 326
Cooley, Const. Law, 75. The State did not tax the receipts. It
professed to tax only the real property, and the personal property
of the corporations, within the State.
It was not difficult to find a value of this property. If the
value to be ascertained, was the value in money, in the market,
the value of the personal property, was, as has been said, respectively $42,065, $28,438, and $23,430. A horse, the day on
which it was bought by the American Express Company, was
worth $200. The company paid so much for it. Had the company desired to sell it, it would have sold for the same. The
method of valuation adopted by State, made it worth 20 times as
much. Similarly the market value of every wagon, of every
truck of every pouch, was multiplied by 20.
What was the justification for this? Nothing more than
that, with $23,430 worth of personalty (market value considered)
the company was able to make, in one year, $275,446. Says
Fuller, C. J., "Considered as distinct subjects of taxation a horse"
is indeed a horse, a wagon a wagon, a safe a safe, a pouch a
pouch," but then follows the stunning question: "how is it that
$23,430 worth of horses, wagons, safes and pouches, produces
$275,446 in a single year." The company, by means of these
things, makes $275,446 a year. Hence, the things are worth
more than their market value.
If a lawyer by means of a pen and a piece of paper, on which
he writes a will or contract gets a fee of $100, the pen or paper is
worth $100, or $75, or $50 or some other large fraction of the fee
earned! But, how can this be said with any propriety? The
paper does not produce the contract or will. The lawyer produces that. But he could not produce it without the paper as a
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in value 100, 1000, 10,000 per cent., because it has entered, as a
condition, into the production of the fee? That particular paper
was not necessary. Any other would have done just as well.
The man who wrote the will was the producer of so much of the
value of the contract or will, as exceeded the market value of the
pen, ink, and paper.
A employs two men to work on raw material. The material
costs $10; the wages of the men employed in the production of a
machine from it, amount to $20, the machine sells for $200. Are
we to say that the labor of the workmen is worth $200, or $100
or $50? Are we to say that the material that enters into the
machine was worth more than it cost on the market?
When the express company makes $275,446 a year, in the
use of implements worth $23,430, it is not the implements that
make the money, but the corporation that uses them. The'corporation uses skill, address, industry; it employs men, it draws
patronage by its reputation, founded on the efficiency of its past
service to the public; it exercises its franchise of corporate action.
It charges high prices for the service which it renders, that is,
prices which make its profits abnormally large. This is a circumstances whichjustifies the State in taking stepsto limit the rate
of charge, possibly, but it cannot make the value of the personalty greater, because of the opportunity of making large profits
in part by means of it. It would be .well for the State to share in
the excessive profits by means of taxation, but the tax should be
put on properly taxable things; not on improperly taxable, by the
ruse of misestimating the value of the personal property, by considering the money-making faculty of the corporation an attribute not of the corporation, but of the chattels which belong to it.
Fuller, C. J., thinks that the whole property of the corporation, in all the States, can be considered as a unit, engaged in
prodticing the annual profits of the corporation; that these profits
can be apportioned among the States, according to the amounts
therein, of the property of the corporation; and that the apportioned share of the profits, in any particular State, may be considered as the product of the property used in that State and
therefore that the value of this property may be ascertained by
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assuming it to be produced by the profits made in the business
by the use of the property.
The unity thus alleged is simply the simultaneousness of the
use of different pieces of property toward a common end. A has a
wagon, in which to haul loads. If a full load is to be hauled,
two horses must be employed together. Are we to say that if the
horses are severally worth $200, they become worth more than
$200 because the productiveness of their joint use is more than
twice as great as that of the use of but one? Is the capacity of
their common owner to earn so much by the joint use of the two,
in hauling the same loads, to be by some hocus-pocus attributed
to the horses themselves?
The best that Fuller, C. J., can say in defense of the taxation
imposed by Ohio, is, that similar taxation has been approved in
three, four or five cases previously decided. The earning power
of a railroad has been taken to be the measure of the value of the
rails, ties, cars, locomotives, etc. This value has been distributed
among the various parts of this road, in the several States, in
proportion to the lengths of these parts. Worse, the total earning power of the Pullman Palace Car Company as expresscd by
the value of its capital stock has undergone a distribution among
the States, proportionately to the number of miles therein, traversed by any car or cars. Hence the Ohio tax on the express
companies is sound. The court takes its own past decisions as
its premises, and thinks itself logical, when it draws from them,
intrinsically indefensible and absurd, the inevitable conclusions.
After referring to these earlier unsatisfactory decisions, Fuller,
C. J., complacently observes "No more reason is perceived for
limiting the valuation of the property of express companies to
horses, wagons and furniture, than that of railroad, telegraph,
and sleeping car companies, to roadbed, rails and ties, poles and
wires or cars. The unit is a unit of use and management, and the
horses, wagons, safes, pouches and furniture, the contracts for
transportation facilities, the capital necessary to carry on the
business-whether represented in tangible or intangible property,-in Ohio, possessed a value in combination and from use
in connection with the property and capital elsewhere, which
could as rightfully be recognized in the assessment for taxation
in the instance of these companies as the others."
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To say that these horses, wagons, etc., possess a value in
combination from use in connection with other property, is simply to say that the owner, the company, can earn a sum of money,
in part by means of this property, thus used in combination,
and that, therefore, some undefined fraction of this earning power
is to be assigned to the horses and wagons so as to make their
value 20 times as great as it would be, should the particular horses
or wagons be sold, and others substituted, and as it was, the day
before each horse or wagon began thus to be employed. The
earning power is to be attributed to the implement, and not to the
wielder of it, though a thousand other implements, of exactly the
same sort, are waiting to be employed, should the employer
grow tired of the one that he is at present using. A skilful man
has a lathe, by which he earns $20 a day. An unskilful man
has a lathe of exactly the same sort, but he earns with it only $5.
The lathe of the skilful worker is worth four times as much as
that of the unskilful!
A owns a watch, and by diligent and punctual use of time,
made possible by it, earns so much. A sluggard owns a similar
watch, but earns only one third as much. A tax is imposed on
watches, according to value. The first watch must pay three
times as much tax as the second.
Two lawyers have each a set of the State reports, costing
$500. One makes $10,000 a year, and the other $1000 from his
profession. If a tax is put on books, the first lawyer must pay
ten times as much tax as the latter, because the value of his books
is so much greater!
When a worker produces a result by means of a tool, is it
the worker, or the tool that produces it? If he uses two tools, in
what proportion are we to attribute the result to the worker and
to the tools? One third to the former; one third to each of the
latter? Or one half to each of the tools, the worker not counting?
If A without a machine, would earn $50 in a week, but with
it, would produce a result for which he would obtain $1000, he
would be willing to pay for this machine $100, $500, $800, $900,
if he could not get another for less. But, having paid $50 for
it, he can get as many more as he wants, for the same price or
less. With what propriety can it be said that the machine,
though worth to others but $50, is worth to him $900? It
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would be worth to him $900 if, and if, etc., but it is worth to him
only what he can replace it for. The horses, wagons, safes, etc.,
were not worth to the company, more than the cost of replacing
them.
Express companies are able to make enormous profits, by
means of every little capital. They hire the transportation of
goods from the railroad companies. They own a few horses,
trucks, etc., in each town. They employ men at very moderate
wages to receive and to deliver packages. Their business being
largely interstate, a tax at their domiciles upon it, would give an
undue revenue to the domiciliary state. Some way ought to be
devised, for allowing the States in which their business is done, to
tax it proportionately to the amount done therein. Congress
doubtless could authorize such proportional taxation. In any
event, a State can tax the intra-state business even of a corporation most of whose business is inter-state. The State or the
United States ought to make impossible the excessive earnings
of these corporations, at the expense of their patrons. But irregular taxation is not an adequate means of doing so. Nothing
hinders the increase of rates to meet the growing tax, so that their
patrons would ultimately pay it. The methodadopted by Ohio
and other States to compel such corporations to pay what they
deem a fair tax, is to be deprecated. Professing to impose a
tax on property only, out of a show of deference to the constitutional principles which prevent their taxing non-residents on
property not within their borders, or their taxing the business of
inter-state commerce, they are driven to demoralizing evasions
and tergiversations. They resort to chicanery of holding the
value of a thing not dependent on its general utility, and the effect
of that upon its market value, but upon its utility in the form of
money getting, to the particular owner. Thus they tax not the
property, which they are permitted to tax, but the earning power
of interstate commerce, the property which is beyond their jurisdiction, on the pretext that they are taxing ad valorem, the property only found within their boundaries. Of this chicanery, the
federal courts have become weak abettors, so that they also are
demoralized. They palpably juggle with principles, uncandidly
professing to maintain them, while they are in fact repudiating
them.
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MOOT COURT
MENTZER v. CAROTHERS
Rights of Lunatic Under Uniform Stock Transfer Act and at Common
Law to Recover Certificates of Stock Transferred While Insane
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Mentzer owned one hundred shares of Pennsylvania railroad stock
represented by two certificates for fifty shares each. Mentzer was known
to be a lunatic who enjoyed lucid intervals. No committee was appointed
to care for his estate. During a lucid interval he indorsed one of said
certificates in blank, later during a period of insanity, he indorsed the
other certificate and then sold it to a party, who in turn sold them to
Carothers, who paid full value, and had io notice of Mentzer's insanity.
OPINION OF THE COURT
KRAUSE, J.-The question at issue here is whether there was a conversion or more technically speaking whether plaintiff could recover certificates from an innocent purchaser for value?
Plaintiff admits that he cannot recover the certificate which was endorsed by him during the lucid interval. Now the question arises as to
the validity of the transfer of the second certificate which was endorsed
during an insane period.
Under section seven of the stock transfer act, if the delivery of the
certificate was made after the owner's legal incapacity the possession of
the certificate may be reclaimed and the transfer thereof rescinded, unless
the certificate has been transferred to a purchaser for value in good faith
without notice of any facts making the transfer wrongful. Applying this
section to the facts of this case, we think the plaintiff cannot recover,
because the defendant was a purchaser for value and without notice,
therefore I am of the opinion that the plaintiff cannot recover the certificates and judgment should be rendered for the defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
Mentzer indorsed one of the certificates when he was sane and delivered it when he was insane. The other certificate he indorsed when
,insane and delivered it when he was sane.
He is therefore entitled to recover the second certificate only. He is
precluded from recovering the first certificate by the 6th and 7th sections of
the uniform stock transfer act which provide that "the indorsement of a
certificate by the person appearing by the certificate to be the owner of
the shares represented thereby is effectual, except as provided in section
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seven, tho the indorser or transferrer has become legally incapacitated after
the endorsement ** * before the delivery of the certificate," and that if a
"delivery of a certificate is made after the owner's legal incapacity" the
certificate cannot be reclaimed from a bona-fide holder for value."
He is entitled to recover the second certificate by the common law
which has not in this respect been changed by the uniform act. Section
two provides that "nothing in this act shall be construed as enlarging the
powers of a person lacking full legal capacity to make a valid indorsement." Judgment reversed.

COMMONWEALTH v. ATKINS
Construction of Penal Statute-Necessity of Presence of Intent to the
Imposition of Penalty
STATE-MENT OF FACTS
A statute declares that if any dog shall be upon the streets of any
borough or city without a collar having the owner's name thereon, it shall
be killed by a police officer and the owner shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
Atkins' dog wandered from his house and while on the street, lost his collar by the act of some persons or otherwise without the knowledge of
Atkins. He is indicted for violation of the statute.
Strite for commonwealth.
Renard for defendant.

OPINION OF THE COURT
STECKEL, J.-The case at bar raises two questions: (a) the constitutionality of the act; (b) if the act is constitutional, is the intent to
disregard the provisions thereof material to the imposition of the penalty
therein provided for.
We find little difficulty in arriving at the conclusion that the act is
constitutional. Statutes authorizing the imposition of fines and penalties
for permitting animals to go at large, their seizure, impounding and sale
without personal notice, judicial inquiry, or determination, are not unconstitutional, because authorizing a confiscation of property without due
process of law or without compensation; 2 Cyc., 438; Conier & Whitney,
9 Phil., 184. For the proposition, that statutes which require the owners
of dogs to restrain them, or which authorize- them to be killed if found at
large are a valid exercise of the police power conferred upon municipal
or other local authorities we have the following authorities: Com. v.
Markham, 7 Bush (Ky.), 486; Com. v. Chase, 6 Cush, 248; Corn .v. Dow,
10 'ets, 382; 15 L. R. A., 249 and cases cited in note thereunder.
The remaining question is the necessity of an intent to violate the act
in order that the imposition of penalty may be made.
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The decision of this point involves and is dependent upon the cobstruction of the act.
In construing a penal statute courts follow the doctrine that such a
statute must be given a reasonable construction, so as to make it subserve the purpose for which it was enacted. The case must be within
not only the letter but also the spirit of the act in order that the penalty
will be inflicted. 3 L. R. A., 224 and cases cited in the notes thereunder.
Philadelphia v. Costello, 17 Sup., 339; Com. v. Standard Oil Co., 101 Pa.,
150, and by way of obiter dictum in the cases discussed below. But we
have another doctrine originally laid down by Mr. Greenleaf: The rule
that ignorance of fact will excuse "would seem to hold good in all cases
where the act, if done knowingly would be malum in se. But where a
statute commands that an act be done or omitted, which in the absence of
such statute might have been done or omitted without culpability, ignorance of the fact or state of things contemplated by the statute, it seems will
not excuse violation." Com. v. Weis, 139 Pa., 247. In Pa., we find the
foregoing rule the doctrine of the cases in which statutes forbidding the
sale of oleomargarine and statutes prohibiting the sale of liquor to minors
(etc.), are construed. The rule has for its reason that when the result of
the statute is intended to be an absolute prohibition of some act or acts,
the intent with which the act was done is immaterial.
In the liquor case, the result to be attained was that no liquor should
be sold to any minor, under any circumstances. It was immaterial that
the seller did not know the buyer to be an infant. A seller of liquor was
in the future to carry on his business at his own risk. This stringent measure was passed to cure an evil to society, and the enormity of the evil
was reason for the harsh and unbending statute with the decisions rendered under it. The same reasoning applies to the oleomargarine statutes
in Com. v. Weiss, 139 Pa., 251; Com. v. Miller, 131 Pa., 118. The construction of statutes on rape is based on the reasoning above.
Com. v. Labar, 32 Sup., 228, applies the doctrine announced by Mr.
Greenleaf. In that case a man was indicted under a statute for felling
trees (etc.) on certain State property. The defense was he thought he was
on his own land. The court in construing the statute went into history
of the events that led to the passage of the act and decided that under the
circumstances the legislature meant the intent to be immaterial. The
history referred to was that in a particular part of the State timber had
been removed from the land to the extent that the country was so barren of
trees that the water supply of the country was effected. Under these circumstances the couit arrived at the conclusion that the legislature meant
the intent to be immaterial to an imposition of the penalty.
In these cases, in addition to seeing the Greenleaf doctrine, we find
that whether a guilty knowledge is a necessary ingredient of a statutory
offense is a matter of construction.
What was the effect sought to be produced by this act? It obviously
was to clean the State of all dogs for whose injury to property no one
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was responsible. In every town there are stray dogs, and in their search
for food, or ordinary roving, they do damage to property at some time,
and there is no one responsible therefor. The statute clearly meant to
kill these off. If a dog had on a collar with his owner's name upon it,
the dog upon capture would reveal his owner's identity, and if any harm
had been done by the animal repairs might be made. The statute did not
mean to deny to any one the right to keep a dog. But owners must keep
them under certain restrictions and these restrictions were set down in
the act. The effect of selling liquor to minor&, and the effect of keeping
a dog are entirely different upon society. The former is admittedly
harmful in itself, while the latter has no such quality.
We have yet to examine the working of the act. If any dog shall be
upon the streets ...... without a collar bearing the owner's name thereon,
he shall be liable to be killed by a police officer and the owner shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor."
The words "shall be upon the streets" convey the idea that regardless
of the intent of the owner, if the dog was found on the streets without a
collar, he (the dog) should be killed and the owner fined. But this
court holds that from the substance of the act and the result to be attained
the legislature meant that a penalty should be imposed only when the
owner of a dog failed to place a collar on the dog, and should the dog
lose the collar, a reasonable time be given the owner to secure another.
Defendant acquitted.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
It is stated as a fundamental proposition of the criminal law that
every crime is composed of a "criminal act" and a "criminal intent."
In the great majority of crimes the "criminal act" is,composed solely
of a physical element, but, to constitute the "criminal act" of some crimes,
there must be added to this physical element a mental element which is
known, technically, as a "specific intent."
The physical element of the "criminal act" is in some crimes an act,
and in other crimes an omission, but because this physical element is, in
the great majority of crimes, an act, and is in most crimes the sole eleinent of the "criminal act," it is frequently called the criminal act.
The "specific intent," which in some crimes is an essential element of
the "criminal act," denotes the purpose which inspires the actor and the
ulterior object whose accomplishment he has in view in the commission
of the act; that is, it is an intent to accomplish something more than is
involved in the act itself.
The "criminal intent" which is said to be an essential element of every
crime and which, to distinguish it from the "specific intent," is frequently
called the "general criminal intent" is a very complex mental state which
varies in the different crimes. It involves: (1) a certain degree of mental
capacity, and therefore a certain degree of insanity constitutes a defense;
(2) knowledge or a reasonable opportunity to know certain facts, and
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therefore mistake of facts may constitute a defense; (3) freedom of the
mind from certain forms of coercion, and therefore duress, coverture, the
extreme pressure of circumstances may constitute a defense; (4) a fourth
element which is itself frequently called the criminal intent.
This fourth element may be (1) an intent to do the very act which
the law forbids, in which case it may be called a direct intent; (2) an intent to do some other wrongful act from the doing of which the forbidden
act results as an unintended consequence; in which case it is called a
constructive intent;; (3) the state of mind which- accompanies nbgligent
conduct in doing an act not in itself wrongful from which the forbidden
act results as an unintended consequence, in which case, for want of a
better word, it may be called a negative intent.
The learned counsel for the defendant contends that in the present
case the fourth element of the "criminal intent" was. not present in any
of its phases, and therefore the defendant cannot be legally convicted.
On the other hand the learned counsel for the state admits the premises
but denies the conclusion.
The contention of the state is (1) that it is competent for the legislature to make acts criminal irrespective of the existence of any "criminal
intent;" (2) that the legislature has' done so in this case. It is undoubtedly true that it has been asserted frequently that the legislature may make
acts or omissions criminal regardless of the existence of any criminal intent. An examination of the cases cited for this proposition discloses the
fact that in none of them did the courts hold that the legislature had eliminated or could eliminate all the elements of the "criminal intent;" it was
simply held that the legislature could eliminate and had eliminated some
of the elements of the criminal intent. In other words it was held that the
''criminal intent" which was an essential element of the crime defined
was less complex than in ordinary cases because the legislature had eliminated one of its elements. It is conceivable that the legislature might
make a certain physical condition criminal regardless of the existence of
any of the ordinary elements of the criminal intent, but so far the legislatures have not done so. How far such legislation would be constitutional
is doubtful. A statute which eliminated the first element of the criminal
intent has been declared unconstitutional.
The State contends, and the defense concedes, however ,that it is competent for the legislature to eliminate the fourth element of the criminal
intent which we will hereafter call the criminal intent, and the precise
question presented for decision is whether in this case the legislature has
done so.
For the solution of questions of a similar character two theories have
been advanced. According to one, the commission of any act forbidden by
statute is a crime, tho it was not accompanied by a criminal intent, unless
the statute expressly require such intent. This theory is usually regarded
as too harsh. Another theory is that the criminal intent is always an
essential element unless it has been expressly eliminated by the statute.
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The true theory lies between these two. As is said in a leading case,
Reg. v. Tolson, 23. 2. B. D. 168. This is the letter following P. in the alphabet. The question depends upon the subject matter of the enactment,
and the various circumstances which make one construction or the other
reasonable or unreasonable."
It will be noticed that in this statement there is no reference to an inquiry as!to the intention of the legislature. In many cases, however, the
courts have pretended that they were endeavoring to ascertain what was
the intention of the legislature. Such an inquiry is absurd. The legislature probably did not contemplate the situation with which the courts had
to deal, and therefore did not have any intention in regard to it, and if
the legislature did contemplate the situation and have an intention with
regard to it, any inquiry as to what that intention was!, would be futile in
absence of an expression of it in the statute itself. What the courts do is
to decide what the legislature would have intended, had it contemplated
the situation, and they decide this question by considering what they
would have intended had they been members of the legislature.
Unembarrassed therefore by any duty to search for an intention of the
legislature as to the application of the statute to the present case this
court proceeds to decide, and in doing so probably legislates, that the judgment of the learned court below must be affirmed.
The object which the statute accomplishes is not sufficiently clear,
and the public evil which it presents is not sufficiently apparent, to convince us that its penalty should be inflicted upon one who without fault
on his!part is brought within its terms. The statute does not prevent dogs
being on the street because a dog with a collar is not within its terms.
The statute does not prevent the injuries which may be inflicted upon persons or property by dogs on the street, because a dog without a collar is
not more apt to do injury than a dog with one. The statute is not a
public revenue measure because no fee is charged for the right to put a
to furnish knowledge as to ownership of dogs to persons who were interested. We can think of no person who could have any real interest in
knowing to whom a dog belonged, save perhaps those persons who were
injured by the dog. But the infliction of injuries by dogs whose ownership is not known, but could have been known had the dog worn a collar
bearing the owner's name, is neither so frequent nor serious an evil, as to
warrant the construction of the statute for which the state contends.
In Heisrodt v. Hackett, 34 Mich., 283, it was held that a statute which
provided that any person might kill any dog * * * * not collared according
to law, did not make the plaintiff's failure to collar his dog a defense to
an action for damages for the killing of such dog by the defendant's dog.
The court added, "The court also erred in refusing to charge as requested
by the plaintiff's counsel. If the plaintiff had complied with the provisions
of the statute, * * * * and by accident the collar was lost, a reasonable
time must have been allowed the plaintiff to discover and replace it.
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There is so much justice and common sense in thus allowing the owner to
discover and replace the collar that no argument is required to demonstrate it."

The reasons which led to the decisions in the cases where oleo was
sold and where liquor was sold to minors are not applicable to the present
case, but an extended examination of this question is rendered unnecessary by the fact that the decisions in these cases caused such universal
dissatisfaction that statutes changing the law were immediately passed.
Judgment affirmed.
BATES v. HILL
In an Action of Replevin for Property in the Hands of an Innocent Purchaser from the Thief, the Defendant is not Entitled to Compensation
for Time and Labor Expended.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A calf stolen from Bates was sold by the thief to Hill who paid a fair
price and had no notice of the defect in the title. Bates soon found out
that Hill was in possession of the calf, but he waited a year before demanding its return to him. Upon Hill's refusal, Bates brings replevin.
It is contended by Hill that he has trebled the value of the calf since it
was discovered by Bates to be in his possession and that Bates should be
held liable to reimburse him for care and feed expended during the period,
or else that he be estopped to claim title to the calf.
Chase for plaintiff.
Pannell for defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
ALEXAITIS, J.-In the case at bar there are two questions involved,
(1) can the plaintiff recover in replevin his stolen calf that was sold to
defendant by the thief, and (2) recover without reimbursing defendant for
feed and care while in his possession.
Replevin lies in Pennsylvania, where one man claims goods without
regard to the manner in which possession was obtained. P. & L. Dig. of
Dec., vol. 17-30386.
There is no question the plaintiff can recover on the first count. In
Pennsylvania the action of replevin has been liberally extended, and it
embraces almost every case of personal property which is in possession
of one person and claimed by another. Snyder v. Vaux, 2 Rawle, 423-1830.
In Hosack v. Weaver, 1 Yeates, 478, and Hard v. Metzgar, 2 Yeates,
348 two Pennsylvania cases, it was held that persons should be careful how they purchase personal property from strangers. In these instances "Caveat emptor," is and ought to be the rule, since no one can
transfer a greater right to things than he himself has. In the present
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case when the thief sold the calf to Hill, all that he, the thief, could pass
was the possession, and possession is not and cannot be title of any color.
The doctrine of market overt does not obtain in Pennsylvania, the
owner of a lost or stolen chattel may recover it in replevin from a bonafide purchaser, who bought it for full consideration in an open market,
after it had been publicly shown there. S. & P., vol. 4-4126. According
to this statute it may be inferred that from anyone who purchases chattels
in private or in public, from a person not having a clear title, replevin
will lie. So in this case Hill could not have a clear title in the calf when
he bought it from the thief.
In replevin property wrongfully taken or detained the defendant
has, since such wrongful taking or detention, expended money or labor
in increasing the value of the property, according to the general rule he is
not entitled to have any deduction from the value of the property for the
money or labor so expended. 24 Amer. & Eng. Cyc., 517
In Allen v. Fox, 51 N. Y., 562, there was an action of replevin to recover possession of a horse. It was held the jury are required to assess
the value of the property and damages for its detention. The value there
intended was the value at the time of the trial. In case the prevailing
party could have obtained a delivery of the property, he must have taken
it as it then was. The damages for detention are the same, whether the
party recover the property or its value.
Easton v. Worthington, 5 S. & R., 130-1819, a Pennsylvania case, it
was held that where a mare had been delivered to plaintiff, whether the act
was felonious or fraudulent, could not divest the defendant of his right,
if the defendant pleads property, and it is found for him, the verdict ought
not to be for damages for the value, but a general finding for the defendant, and damages for detention.
According to the doctrine in the above cases, it may be laid down that
Hill cannot estop Bates from recovering the calf. As Hill had no title
in the calf after he bought it from the thief, it follows necessarily from
those principles that he could not recover reimbursement for care and
feed of the calf.
Although the plaintiff waited a year before bringing this action, he
cannot be estopped, as he was still within the statute of limitations.
Though this ruling may seem absurd, the law must be observed. It,
therefore, follows that the verdict must be given for the plaintiff.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
A large number of cases support the rule that one, whose personal
property has been improved by another, without authority but under a
bona-fide mistake as to ownership, may follow and reclaim the property
so long as it remains capable of identification. 1 Cyc., 222; Estey Co.
v. Dick, 41 Super. 610.
It has also been held that the innocent trespasser has no lien upon
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the property for the value of his services. upon it. Busch v. Lisher, 89
Mich., 192; Gates v. Boom Co., 70 Mich., 309.
This holding is merely an application of the general rule that "in
order to charge a chattel with this (i.
e. for services performed) lien, the
labor for which the lien is claimed must have been done at the request of
the owner or under circumstances from which his assent can be reasonably
implied." Myers v. Bralespiece, 174 Pa., 119. Estey Co. v. Dick, 41
Super., 610.
It is also consistent with the doctrine which is asserted by the Pennsylvania cases where the subject matter of the controversy was real estate
5 P. & L. Dig. Dec. c. 7597.
Prior to 1901, the trespasser was not remediless. It was held that
where the trespasser was sued in replevin and gave a property bond and
retained the property the damages awarded the plaintiff were the same as
in the action of trespass and allowance was therefore made for the defendants expenditure. Young v. Herdic, 55 Pa., 172; Phillips v. Stroup, 17
Atl., 220.
By giving a property bond the trespasser could always transform the
action of replevin into an action for damages in which the measure of the
plaintiff's recovery was the value of the property less the value put upon
it by labor and expenditures of the defendant. Sec. 34 Cyc., 1569. "Such
a standard of damages," says the court in Young v. Cedric, "is reasonable
and just."
Since the passage of the act of April 19, 1901, P. L., 88, a defendant in
replevin cannot, by giving a property bond, transform the action into an
action for damages. The plaintiff, if successful, may at his option, have
issued a writ in the nature of a writ retorno habendo requiring the defendant to deliver the property to him. The giving of a property bond by the
defendant no longer divests the plaintiff's title to the goods nor does it
transform the action into an action for damages. The plaintiff, like a
successful plaintiff in ejectment, is entitled to a delivery of the property
and it would seem to follow that, as in ejectment, the defendant has no
equity entitling him to have a condition annexed to the verdict for the
plaintiff requiring the defendant to pay the plaintiff the value of the improvements made by the plaintiffs. Sec. 5 P. & L. Dig. Dec. 7598. Estey
Co. v. Dick, 41 Super., 610.
The hardship of the doctrine here enunciated is no greater than that
resulting from a rule which would require an innocent owner either to
surrender his property or pay for improvements which he did not authorize or desire, and "nothing," says the court in Isle Mining Co. v. Herlin,
37 Mich. 332, "could more encourage carelessness than the acceptance of
the principle that one who by mistakes performs labor upon the property
of another should lose nothing by his error, but should have a claim upon
the owner for renumeration. Why should. one be vigilant and careful of
the rights of others if such were the law. Whether mistakes or not is all
the same to him, for in either case he has employment and receives re-
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numeration; while the inconveniences are left to rest with the innocent
owner. Such a doctrine offers a premium to heedlessness and blunders
and a temptation by false evidence to give an intentional trespass the appearance of an innocent mistake."
Does the fact that the plaintiff, after learning that Hill was in possession of the calf, waited a year before claiming it, necessitate a different decision? We think not. It does not appear that-the plaintiff knew
that Hill believed he was the owner of the calf; it does not appear that
Hill the plaintiff knew that Hill was exercising care and labor by which
the value of the calf was trebled. He did know that Bates was in possession, but the statute of limitations does not prescribe one year as the
period within which suits for the recovery of personal property must be
brought.
The fact that Hill asserted ownership was a material fact of which
from all that appears the plaintiff was ignorant. The burden is upon the
party alleging an estoppel to prove the necessary facts. Judgment
affirmed.

HAMMOND v. CLARKE
The Nature of a Promise Required to Pay a Debt Which Has Been Discharged by Bankruptcy Proceedings
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Clark indebted to Hammond to the extent of $1000 became a bankrupt and was discharged from his debts, his estate paying 24 per cent. of
his debts. Later le, on an occasion paid Hammond $100 on account of
the debt. On a later occasion in speaking of his debts which he hoped
some day to pay, he mentioned that of Hammond, and on a third occasion
he told Hammond that he expected to pay all his debts and that Hammond
would be the .rst paid. The debt being unpaid, this is assumpsit on the
promise.
OPINION OF THE COURT
HIBBARD, 3.-The discharge of the bankrupt releases him from all
legal obligation to pay a debt provable in bankruptcy; but the moral obligation of the bankrupt still continues. This moral obligation, united with
a subsequent promise by the bankrupt to pay the debt, is sufficient to constitute a right of action against such bankrupt. 5 Cyc., 407.
Although the effect of a discharge in bankruptcy is to extinguish a
pre-existing debt, not merely to bar the remedy upon it, yet the moral obligation of the debtor is a sufficient consideration to support an express
promise to pay it. The legal obligation of the bankrupt to pay a debt
provable under the act is discharged, yet the moral obligation remains,
and when united with a subsequent promise by the bankrupt to pay the
debt, gives a right of action. Kingston v. Wharton, 2 Serg. & R. (Pa.).
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208; Bolton v. King, 105 Pa., 78; Murphy v. Crawford, 114 Pa., 496. If a
debt is discharged under bankruptcy or insolvency laws, the debtor, by
a promise to pay it, waives the benefit of those laws, and payment may be
compelled. The old consideration sustains the debt; and the better reasoning conducing to this result is, that no consideration is required to
make valid a promise to waive a privilege which the law has tendered.
If a legal liability once existed, and to the liability some rule of positive law allows a defense which is a bar to an action on the liability
though it does not extinguish the debt, an express promise may be based
on such liability as a consideration. "Page on Contracts." A discharged
debt is not a debt paid. The moral consideration remains, and is sufficient consideration for a new promise to pay. "Collier on Bankruptcy,"
232. There is, therefore, little doubt as to the plaintiff's right of action,
if a subsequent promise can be shown.
The vital question is then, whether the partial payment united with the
defendant's assertions of expectation and hope, constitute a sufficient
new promise to waive the privilege which the law has tendered. In Huffman v. Johns, 6 Atl. Rep., 205, Johns asked Huffman to renew the note,
at which time the latter made a promise to pay the note. On the same
day Huffman sold Johns a horse at $120, to be a credit on said note. Held,
in order to restore the legal efficacy of a debt discharged by proceedings
in bankruptcy, the promise to pay must undoubtedly be unambiguous and
explicit. Than this, there could be nothing more unequivocal, and it
fully and in every particular complies with the rule for the revival of the
discharged debts. Applying this to the case at hand, there was not only
an unconditional promise by the defendant to pay the debt, but also a
partial payment, which alone in Wesner v. Stein, 97 Pa., 322, was a sufficient acknowledgment of the debt from which to infer a promise to pay.
A statement in the following terms: "We owe her the money; will
pay her some day; can't say when," held under the circumstances of this
case, to be a sufficient new promise to support a suit for a debt which had
been extinguished by proceedings in bankruptcy. Bolton v. King, 105
Pa., 78. Here we find a clear recognition of the debt, but the time of
payment both uncertain and indefinite. It may mean any time-to-day, tomorrow, or perhaps a posthumous payment.
It has been repeatedly held that from a clear, distinct and unequivocal
acknowledgment, a promise may be inferred, if that acknowledgment is
consistent with a promise. In the absence of an express promise to pay
the debt, it must amount to a clear and unambiguous recognition of an existing debt, so distinct and expressive as to preclude hesitation as to the
debtor's meaning, and as to the particular debt to which it applies. It
must, moreover, be consistent with a promise to pay. Palmer v. Gillespie, 95 Pa., 340; Wesner v. Stein, 97 Pa., 322. Comparing these to the
case in question, we find that the partial payment of Clarke was a clear,
distinct and unambiguous acknowledgment of the pre-existing debt. Add
to this the statement of Clarke, to the effect that he fully intended to pay
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the debt and that Hammond would be the first paid, the result will be a
clear, distinct and unequivocal promise to pay the debt in controversy.
An admission consistent with a promise to pay will imply the promise without its having been actually made. There must not be uncertainty
as to the particular debt to which the admission applies. "Palmer v.
Gillespie, 95 Pa., 340.
In conclusion, therefore, we think that the partial payment, coupled
with and followed by the assertions of defendant, constitute a sufficient
new promise to revive the discharged debt. Judgment accordingly.
OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
In order that it may furnish the basis for an action, a promise to pay
a debt which had been discharged in bankruptcy must be clear, distinct
and unequivocal. 28 Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas., 742. Bollon v. King, 105
Pa., 81. Holbrough v. Murphy, 114 Pa., 358. It must be an express promise to pay the specific debt. Matthewson v. Needham, 81 Kansas, 340;
105 Pac. 438; 26 S. R. A. N. S., 274. Bolton v. King, 105 P., 81.
There was no such promise in this case. The conduct of the defendant may be resolved into three elements:
(1) A partial payment of the discharged debt. "He paid Hammond
$100 on account of the debt."
(2) An expression of hope. "He hoped some day to pay" the debt of
Hammond.
(3) An expression of expectation. "He expected to pay all of hisdebts and Hammonds would be the first paid."
(1) It is well settled that partial payments of a debt discharged in
bankruptcy are not sufficient to establish a new liability to pay- the debt.
26 L. R. A. N. S., 274, 19 Ann. Cas., 146. collecting the cases.
(2) An expression of a hope to pay is not sufficient to establish a
new liability. 28 Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas., 742; Bartlett v. Peck, 5 La.
Ann., 669; Tompkins v. Huzen, 30 App. Div., 359; 51 N. Y. S., 1003.
(3) An expression of an expectation to pay is not sufficient. 28 Am.
& Eng. Ann. Cas., 742; McCoe v. Rosene, 66 Wash., 73; 118 Pac.,-881, it
is held that letters from a disxcharged bankrupt stating that he expects to
pay a debt discharged by the bankruptcy proceedings and that he wants to
do so are unsufficient as a new promise to revive the debt.
In this case there was no express promise by the defendant to pay all
of his discharged debts nor was there an express promise to pay thedebt of the plaintiff. The defendant did not promise to pay all of his.
debts and then state the plaintiff's would be the first one paid, nor did he
promise absolutely to pay the plaintiff. He stated, that he expected to pay,
all his debts., This statement imposed no liability. He next stated that
the plaintiff would be the first person paid. This was not a promise topay the plaintiff. It was merely a statement of the defendant's intention
to pay Hammond first in the carrying out of his expectation to pay all.
A statement of an intention to pay is not sufficient. 28 Am. & Eng.
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Ann. Cas., 742. Even if the language of the defendant is construed as a
promise to pay the plaintiff first it is not sufficient to create liability because it does not amount a promise to pay "without qualification or condition" but to a conditional promise that if the defendant pays any of his
debts he will pay the plaintiff's first. In Bolton v. King, 105 Pa., 81, it
is held that "the promise to restore a debt from which a debtor has been
discharged in bankruptcy must be without qualification or condition and
must contain all the essentials of a valid express agreement excepting only
the element of consideration."
In Cox v. Rosene, 66 Wash., 73; 118 Pac., 881, a letter in which the
defendant said "yes, I have paid quite a few of the old losses, except to
pay more and the next one shall be to the family of iny departed friend,"
written in reply to a letter requesting pay of a note due the "departed
friend," was held not to contain a clear distinct and unequivocal promise
to pay the note.
Many of the cases cited by the learned court below relate to the manner in which a debt barred by the statute of limitations may be revived.
Such cases are not authorities upon the question presented by this case.
See Bolton v. King, 105 Pa., 81. Judgment reversed.

COMMONWEALTH v. WILLIAMS
Knowledge of the Falsity of a Statement Necessary to a Conviction Under
the False Pretense Act of March 31st, 1860, Sec. III-Intention to Defraud Distinguished from the Act Which in Itself Defrauds-The
Person Who Alleges He Was Defrauded Need Not Show That He
Ordinarily Acted Prudently.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Williams sold to Hendricks a horse, saying that he was sound and
warranting him to be so. Hendricks told him that he accepted the horse
in reliance on the truth of his assertion. The horse had a serious disease which would kill him in a short time and meanwhile reduced his
working power. The price paid was $225.00. The horse was not worth
$50.00. Williams is prosecuted for obtaining the $225.00 by false pretenses.
Maxey for the plaintiff.
Massinger for the defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
NEWMAN, J.-This was an indictment of one Williams for false
pretences for selling a horse to one Hendricks, which horse he said was
and warranted him to be sound. Hendricks told Williams that he accepted
the horse in reliance on the truth of his assertion. It was later discovered
that the horse had a serious disease which would kill him in a short time,
and which in the meantime reduced his working power. The price paid
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was $225. The horse was not worth $50. Williams is prosecuted for obtaining $225 by false pretences.
The act of March 31st, 1860, sec. 111, says that if any person shall,
by any false pretence, obtain the signature of any person to any written instrument, or shall obtain from any other person any chattel, money, or
valuable security, with intent to cheat and defraud any person of the same,
every such offender shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and on conviction,
be sentenced to pay a fine not exceeding $500, and undergo an imprisonment not exceeding three years. Provided always, that if, after the trial
of any person indicted for such a misdemeanor it shall be proved that he
obtained the property in question in such manner as to amount in law to
larceny; he shall not.by reason thereof be entitled to be acquitted of such
misdemeanor and no person tried for such misdemeanor shall be liable
to be afterwards prosecuted for larceny on the same facts."
The ingredients of the offence are (1) false pretence, i. e. false assertion of a past or existing fact; not a bare, naked lie or a statement of opinion; (2) knowledge at the time of making the false assertion or representation, that it is untrue; (3) an intent to defraud by means of it; (4) the
consummation of the intent;(5) a giving up of the chattel or valuable
security by the prosecutor in alliance on the false representations. All
of these elements must be present in the crime and if all or any one of them
are absent the crime is not committed.
The facts in this case do not state whether the defendant Williams
knew of the falsity of his statements, nor do they state that the defendant
Williams had the intent to defraud Hendricks. And these elements not
being present, the court, being bound solely by the facts as stated, in
order to apply the law, will not imply these elements. There is no doubt
in this case that Williams intended to sell and Hendricks intended to purchase the horse. Neither is there any doubt that Hendricks wanted to
purchase a sound and well horse, and that he purchased the horse because he relied on the truthfulness of Williams' representations to that
effect. Now if Williams knew that his statements were false when he
made them, and if he made such statements with the intent to defraud
Hendricks, then the court thinks that there is no doubt as to his guilt;
for it is.
settled law that where a vendor of chattel or valuable security
makes a false representation or statement concerning that chattel or
valuable security, which he then knew to be false, with the intent to defraud the prospective purchaser, and the latter relying on these representations purchases the chattel from the vendor, such vendor is guilty of false
pretences. Com. v. Jackson, 132 Mass., 16; 1 Trickett's Pa. Crim. Law,
47; Com. v. Balph, 18 Pa. C. C., 242; Com. v. Rosenberg, 1 Pa. C. C., 273.
In the crime of false pretences, knowledge of the falseness of the pretence
by the person making them, is indispensable. Com. v. Talbort, 14 Forum,
215; 1 Trickett Crim. Law, 59.
If on the other hand, Williams did not know of the falsity of his representations as to the soundness of the horse, if he really and bona fide
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believed them to be true when he made them; tho after he made them they
turned out to be false, he is not guilty of false pretence. The representations must be of a fact existing at the time of making them or possibly
having existed before, and if such facts as stated really existed when
made or existed before made and were then true, they are not considered
to be false representations, tho they might later turn out to be false. But
the defendant's statement alone that he actually believed the horse to be
sound when he sold it, is not alone conclusive. The mere fact of his
saying so doesn't make it so; but other facts and circumstances! must be
considered, as to whether or not he actually did believe his representations
to be true when he made them. The fact that the horse had never been
sick or ailing; that he always took the best of care of him; that he had recently had him examined by a veterinary, are such facts as would tend
to prove that defendant actually believed the horse to be sound, and that
he didn't know that he was then unsound. Com. v. Mullen, 4 D. R., 656.
The facts in the case at bar show that Hendricks purchased the horse
in reliance on Williams' assertion and warranty that the horse was sound.
The court thinks that in this case the warranty was the principle thing
that induced Hendricks to purchase. If this is so it would still not affect
the decision in this case for it has been held in Rex v. Rywell, 1 Starkie,
325, that an indictment will not lie for a deceitful representation and
warranty of the soundness of a horse. It has also been held that neither
a breach of covenant, nor a mere misrepresentation of cost or value, nor a
breach of warranty without anything further, nor a mere naked lie in the
transaction of business constitutes a false pretence under the statute, and
an indictment alleging that defendant falsely represented that a horse,
which was vicious and unsound, was a safe and sound family horse, and
sold him as such, will not be sustained.
Counsel for defense in this case have rightly held that the defendant
must know that his representations are false when he makes them and that
he must make such representations with the intent to defraud. For these
are two of the most important elements of the crime of false pretences.
Had the facts been in this case as defendant supposed them to be, he would
have been guilty of no crime. His mistake would have been one of fact
which is a defense to a crime under the above mentioned circumstances.
Not only must the defendant know of the falsity of his representations,
and intend to defraud the prospective vendee thereby, but it has been held
that to render the crime complete the false pretences must be such as are
calculated to deceive and impose upon a man exercising common prudence
and caution in the affairs of life; there must be an intent to cheat and defraud; and credit must be given on such pretence. Com. v. Hickey, 2 Parson, 317; Com. v. McCrossin, 2 Clark, 6.
The court thinks therefore that the elements of knowledge by defendant of the falsity of his representations, and the absence of intent to defraud on his part not appearing from the facts, that the decision should
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Let the verdict be rendered for the

OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT
The conclusion which the learned court below has reached is warranted by the facts as stated, but we are unable to give our assent to some of
the statements of the opinion in which this, conclusion is announced.
(1) An intent to defraud is an essential element of the crime of false
pretences, but the intent to defraud is simply the intent by the use of
false pretences to induce another to part with title to his property and
confide it to the defendant, when he would not otherwise do so.
(2) The pretence need not be such as is calculated to deceive a person exercising ordinary prudence and caution. It would be monstrous to
hold that the statute was designed to protect only the wary and prudent
who in spite of their vigilance might be overreached by the clever rogue,
and was not design to protect the unwary and imprudent. The latter
class need the protection of the law more than the former. It cannot be
that the criminal law is partial to persons of prudence and caution by protecting them from clever rogues while it leaves the silly and imprudent as
a lawful prey of all scoundreldom. "Nor is it less a false pretence because the party imposed upon might, by common prudence have avoided
the imposition." Com. v. Henry, 22 Pa., 256.
(3) It is no longer the law that an indictment will not lie if a warranty is added to the false representation. S. v. Dorr, 33 Me., 498; Jackson v. P., 18 Ill. App., 508; Watson v. P., 87 N. Y., 561. A warranty is
merely a promise to idemnify and its addition to a false representation
ought to have no more effect in excusing the defendant than the addition
of any other promise, and it is, at present, well settled that there may be
a conviction tho a false representation of a fact was accompanied by a
promise. C. v. Wallace, 114 Pa., 405; C. v. Keeper, 15 W. N. C., 282.
(4) It is almost universally held that a false representation as to the
soundness of an animal is a false pretence within the terms of the statute
28 Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas., 272. "A representation that a horse is sound
by one who knows it not to be, is, within the statute, indictable. It is a
mere pretence of a fact, not mere opinion. And tho the vendor adds warranty, the case is not otherwise." 2 Bishop Crim. Law, 429.

